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3 Sociological reﬂection
In view of the untrustworthiness of observation and its factual data,
Adorno makes an insistent case for their theoretical analysis. Theoretical
analysis, like empirical research, is therefore a key theme in his reﬂections
on sociology. It is also a major issue in contemporary social science
debates. What distinguishes Adorno’s writings on theoretical interpreta-
tion in sociological inquiry is that they question sociology’s ability to offer
conclusions on social life. Theoretical analysis constitutes another site for
Adorno’s negotiations of disciplinary boundaries. His sociologico-
methodological ideas for theoretical interpretation draw heavily on epis-
temological considerations, while these epistemological arguments are
usually forced to address sociological questions. This makes some criss-
crossing between discrete areas unavoidable, especially in the ﬁrst half of
this chapter.
Theoretical analysis in sociology
Adorno’s ideas for theoretical social analysis can be elucidated in three
steps. First, the limitations of factual material must be clariﬁed. The
previous chapter repeatedly stated, without explaining, Adorno’s caveat
that empirical observations cannot adequately represent reality. Thus the
role of theory and its mode of procedure in response to those limitations
come into view, along with the problems and potentials Adorno’s sociol-
ogy develops in its theoretical dimension.
The social limitations of sociological material
Adorno’s sociologico-methodological work strongly criticises ‘positivist’
social science. For Adorno, who admits to a precariously sweeping deﬁ-
nition, positivism means observing, comparing and classifying phenom-
ena; accepting factual materials, the positively given, as the basis for
examining reality; and rejecting theoretical speculation (CM 8–9, SSI
246–7, VSI 17, 33). Positivism suffers from the ‘naiveté that confuses
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facts and ﬁgures . . . with [the world’s] foundation’ (HTS 74). Adorno
took issue with positivist social science’s philosophical underpinnings as
early as 1931, combining his endorsement of logical positivism’s emphasis
on observation with misgivings about its uncritical acceptance of facts for
the truth and its dismissal of all empirically unveriﬁable thoughts (1977:
125–6). In the mid-1930s, Adorno sought to attack ‘positivist’ sociology
directly, although his target, Mannheim’s sociology, arguably deﬁes this
label. Indeed, whereas Adorno’s 1937 Mannheim essay describes
‘Mannheim’s attitude’ as ‘epistemologically positivistic’ (VSI 33),
‘Mannheim ﬂirts with positivism’ according to the same passage in its
1953 version (P 42). The ‘positivist dispute’ inGerman sociology between
critical theorists Adorno and Habermas and critical rationalists Popper
and Albert mainly took place in the ﬁnal decade of Adorno’s life.1 One of
Adorno’s central arguments in these debates is that observation is not
sufﬁcient for grasping reality; that factual data constitute untrustworthy
representations of the world. Focusing on the problems sociology
encounters by virtue of being embedded in the same context it seeks to
examine, Adorno conceptualises the limitations of empirical observations
and materials as socially conditioned:
The inability to experience can by no means only be grasped as a result of
individual developments, let alone developments determined by the laws of the
species. The blinding of cognising consciousness against the subliminal arises
itself from the objective structure of a society whose totality, jointed without
gaps, obstructs the view onto that which continues to exist underneath the sem-
blance of a reconciled condition. (SSI 194)
Adorno distinguishes between reality as it is subjectively perceived and
objective reality itself. However unassuming the subject’s observation of
external reality, perception, he argues, receives impulses from, as well as
always projecting subjective notions onto, reality. The perceiving subject
reconstructs reality – ‘recreates the world outside’ – ‘[f]rom the traces [the
world] leaves behind in its senses’ (DE 155). Perception certainly receives
impulses from the physical components of the individual’s encounter with
reality, from sensations and impressions. But in perception such impulses
are always instantly worked into the subject’s intellectual reconstruction
of reality. Empirical material is never reality as it is but its subjective
reconstruction. The devices subjects employ for recreating the world are
concepts. Epistemology’s putatively most concrete being, ‘components of
1 Popper (PD 290–1, 298–300) rightly underlined that this dispute involved no positivists.
Frisby (PD xxix) saw Adorno as criticising ‘a naive positivism . . . hardly at issue
amongst . . . the disputants’ – but, years after Adorno’s death, added: ‘even though it
may remain in operation in much social scientiﬁc practice’.
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impressions or “sensations”’, are actually inseparable from ‘categorial
moments’ (AE 148, see also HTS 57–8). ‘Perception . . . can be
interpreted . . . only as a thinking performance, . . . as “apprehension in
intuition”,[2] as categorisation’ (AE 154). The dependence of perception
on reconstruction entails that reality is not encountered immediately
(unmittelbar) but always conceptually mediated (vermittlet) (see also DE
159–60, ND 156). No language, no fact (JA 42).
Insofar as every sensing, thinking subject is a living human being,
consciousness, Adorno argues, is an element of, and inseparable from,
the spatio-temporal world (AE 156, 226–7, HTS 16–17, ND 184–5).
Simultaneously, since all human subjects are socialised, consciousness is
socially determined (see CM 11, ND 178–80). Crucially here, the process
of reconstructing reality from sense traces inherent in all subjective per-
ception operates under society’s regulation. What are social, Adorno
speciﬁes, are the forms, schemata or concepts at the subject’s disposal
for reconstructing reality in observation: ‘in all categories of thought the
objectivity of the social process is prior to the contingency of the individual
subject’ (HTS 78, see also DE xvi, 65; 1999: 68). In concepts, Adorno
contends, history has sedimented (MM 127). History is here understood
as collective activities by which humans have been intervening in nature.
Created for and in these interventions (ND 23; see also Cook 2007:
164–5), concepts are social phenomena. Since subjects conceptually
reconstruct reality in line with the prevalent social conditions, observa-
tions and the factual data they procure are always subjectively as well as
socially regulated (CM 221, NLII 63).3 Cognition is socially determined
‘down to every individual sense datum’ (HTS 63). Since social integration
seizes the devices available to observation for grasping reality, empirical
material does not merely represent reality, but has a characteristic social
dimension.
Sociological observations and facts are no exception. Adorno criticises
Mannheim’s method as inductive.Mannheim, he alleges, relies on empir-
ical facts, supposedly established by unbiased observation, for forming
general categorical frameworks (P 37, VSI 16–18). Mannheim tends to
deny that no factual reconstruction of social reality is purely representative
of what it designates, but also shaped by the ‘pre-ordered structure . . . on
which the scientiﬁc subject . . ., along with its “experience”, depends’ (VSI
2 Kant’s ‘synthesis of apprehension’ unites ‘manifoldness’ in ‘intuition’ (1999: 229). Critical
of elementary dissections of consciousness (AE 157), Adorno nevertheless agrees that
cognising objects involves synthesis; that receptivity is combined with spontaneity.
3
‘[S]ociety’ being ‘immanent to experience’ (CM 250), Adorno’s ‘transition’ (MCP 45)
from sociology to philosophy and vice versa is unsurprising.
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33, see also P 43). More than thirty years later, Adorno reiterates that
sociological observations bear a conceptual moment and that the concepts
at the sociologist’s disposal for reconstructing social life are socially pre-
formed. Although empirical ‘methods’, for instance, ‘are objective to the
extent that they do not vary according to the individual psyche of the
researcher who employs them, . . . methods are themselves “functions”
derived from the interaction of human subjects’ (Drake 2004: 308).
Society shapes even the simplest sociological encounters and thematerials
they procure (PD 27).
By saying that ‘nothing under the sun’ is now ‘left outside’ society,
Adorno means that society shapes every facet of the world, including
‘nature’ (IS 65). For ‘[e]ven nature, seemingly untouched by [social
labour,] . . . is . . . mediated’ by humanity’s self-preserving activities
(HTS 68). Society thus affects factual reconstructions of the world also
in that all objective reality, every detail possibly encountered, is subject to
social domination. In sociological terms, the social whole mediates all
social phenomena: human, intellectual, interpersonal and institutional
realities.WhereMannheim seeks to classify a network of co-existing social
forces irreducible to an economic basis, whose laws together determine a
historically speciﬁc epoch (e.g. 1940: 173–90), he threatens to neglect that
the underlying ‘unity of the capitalist system’ governs each facet of social
life in turn (VSI 17). ‘[T]he phenomena’ of sociology ‘are all situated in a
medium that shapes them decisively’ (SoI 188): the ‘universal social
structure’ (GS9.2 357). ‘[T]he behaviour of . . . elements’ registered by
social research, e.g. opinions or attitudes, is ‘to an eminent degree pre-
determined by the context of the whole’ (PETG 29). What is usually
termed ‘background study’, the discernment of the cultural, economic,
social preconditions of people’s answers in interview or questionnaire
material, constitutes one step towards the indispensable examination of
capitalist society in its regulation of diverse aspects of social life.4 Society
impacts on empirical sociological material or data also by affecting every
phenomenon sociologists might observe.
Since empirical facts originate in the subject’s socialised encounter with
a socialised reality, society ‘makes [facts] what they are’ (ND 169, see also
307). AsGroup Experiment accentuates: ‘In all facts, even in the ostensibly
purely sensuous impression, there hides an element of the forming
intellect, . . . even our interest, which directs our attention to this tree
or this house . . . Something more encompassing enters both[,] . . . the
entire society, the entire history of humans judging objects, which is
4 PD 73–5, 83–4, SSI 536–7, 543–5, VSII 674–84.
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simultaneously embodied by the objects themselves’ (GEX 9). Due to
society’s regulation of the primary sociological observations that produce
empirical data as well as of every single social detail observed, sociological
material does not simply represent reality but is also characterised by a
twofold social dimension: ‘the facts . . . are conditioned’ (PD 84–5); ‘the
factual particular has meaning to the extent that . . . the system of
society . . . appears in it’ (JA 41).
The untrustworthiness of sociological observation appears to stem from
the dilemma that observable phenomena are determined by a social whole
which cannot be observed as an ‘immediate fact’ (IS 108). Focusing on
‘isolated’, ‘narrow sectors’, empirical research is ‘in principle’ unable to
address ‘the central questions of the social structure’ – the ‘totality’ – ‘on
which the life of humans depends’ (GS9.2 358). Society enters but hides in
‘dispersed facts’; hence they are ‘always more than what they immediately
seem’ (JA 41).
Although these formulations sketch the problem of observation high-
lighted by Adorno, they do not exhaust his argument. The twofold social
dimension of empirical material raises two demands. Society’s reign over
subjective reconstructions of reality means that the perceiving subject can
understand reality only if it appreciates to what extent its observations and
their factual materials are merely socially guided reconstructions and to
what extent, by contrast, they actually represent traces of reality.
Understanding the social conditions of cognition is indispensable to a
faithful understanding of reality. This requirement reverberates in
Adorno’s statement that ‘[o]nly insight into science’s inherent social
mediations contributes to [its] objectivity’ (PD 19). If factual material
fails to disclose the social conditions of the observation that established it,
it remains untrustworthy. Society’s reign over single objects entails that a
faithful engagement with reality must examine society as it determines
objects. Grasping social phenomena correctly depends on recognising
their mediation by the social whole. ‘There is’, Adorno states, ‘something
like a historical coercion in the movement of things. Subjects on their part
are also conditioned by this historical coercion.’Cognition must ‘account
for this conditionality’ (Adorno and von Haselberg 1965: 487–8). The
twofold social dimension of empirical data, which they acquired by dint of
society’s regulation of observation and of all observable reality, must be
revealed. Likewise, sociological investigations hinge on the disclosure of
the sociological material’s social dimension. Sociological facts must be
understood ‘as expression[s] of the social totality’ (SSI 514, see also 195,
543–6, 581–2; PD 11, 76).
In contemporary capitalism, empirical intuition is particularly con-
strained in meeting these demands. Social integration occasions the
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reiﬁcation and solidiﬁcation of society, culminating in social estrange-
ment. Humans experience social reality as opaque, invariant nature. This
obfuscation makes it especially difﬁcult to grasp society immediately in its
regulation of subjective observation. ‘Humans cannot recognise . . .
society . . . within themselves, because they are estranged from each
other and the whole’ (SP1 69, see also CM 254–5). In galvanised, opaque
society, direct observations do not disclose the social conditions which
regulate them. Hence it is not immediately discernible to what extent
factual material represents reality as opposed to being guided by the social
regulation of its subjective reconstructions. These circumstances also
prevent perception from grasping society’s domination of objects. Direct
intuition, Adorno warns, fails to discern ‘what migrated into the object as
its law of movement’. The object’s social content remains hidden behind
the factual façade, ‘concealed by the ideological form of the phenomenon’
(ND 206). For sociologists, this means that the social whole, particularly
in its current opacity, is imperceptible or unobservable in its character-
ising single social phenomena (IS 34): ‘the facts ascertained do not
faithfully reﬂect the underlying social conditions but rather they simulta-
neously constitute the veil by means of which these conditions, of neces-
sity, disguise themselves’ (PD 85). Empirically established individual
‘opinion[s], attitude[s], mode[s] of behaviour’, for instance, are at best
skewed expressions of the ‘essential laws of society’ governing them, and
usually do not reveal these ‘conditions’ at all (GS9.2 358–9).5 Factual
material discloses neither the social conditions regulating subjective
reconstruction in observation, nor the social components of individual
phenomena. The twofold social dimension of empirical material, includ-
ing that of speciﬁcally sociological data, is not immediately accessible.
Hence, ‘that which is immediate to experience’ is not the ‘real cause’
(HF 25). Facts ‘build a solid wall in front of what is actually taking place’
(CoM 110). Due to social integration, sociological facts have a twofold
social dimension which – notably in galvanised society – is not immedi-
ately transparent. The ‘subject’s loss of experience in the world of the
ever-same’, and the untrustworthiness of its observations, ‘designates the
anthropological side of the . . . estrangement process’; ‘social estrange-
ment consists . . . in removing the objects of cognition from the sphere of
immediate experience’ (P 90). That ‘society cannot be nailed down as a
fact’, Adorno argues (against positivist social science), ‘testiﬁes to . . .
mediation’: ‘the facts’ are not ‘ﬁnal’ (PD 11).
5 For example, the empirical fact that workers no longer believe that they are workers offers
only a distorted articulation of the social conditions in which they live.
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The role of theory
Adorno’s 1931 critique of logical positivism already warned that empirical
data required theoretical decipherment because they were not as ‘ﬁnal, . . .
dee[p]’ and ‘indestructible’ as some philosophers of science claimed
(1977: 126). His later writings repeatedly emphasise that untrustworthy
immediate encounters demand persistent reﬂection and interpretation:
‘only speculation which . . . show[s] what really . . . lies behind the . . .
facticity can . . . do justice to reality’ (HF 30). In response to the limitations
of empirical observation, theoretical analysis is given the task of disclosing
the factualmaterial’s hidden social dimension.6 Yet no sooner does theory
thus unsettle the facts’ claim to truth than it begins to reveal its own severe
predicaments.
Decipherment Adorno’s sociologico-methodological work is
shaped by his epistemological considerations, but it seldom reiterates
these considerations in detail. It is helpful to outline some of the episte-
mological ideas before clarifying their signiﬁcance for social research.
According to Adorno, theoretical analysis involves self-reﬂection: theory
examines cognition to distinguish the subject’s reconstruction of reality
from traces of reality itself. Yet this reﬂexive operation is only an initial
critical step. If, to argue with the later Durkheim, notably with his inter-
ventions in the theory of knowledge in The Elementary Forms of Religious
Life (1995: 8–18),7 cognition’s ‘constitutive formants’ have ‘originated
socially’ (CM 257); if even individual sense data are socially governed,
then any ‘critique of experience’ must ‘attai[n] the latter’s . . .
historical, . . . social . . . conditionedness’ (CM 250, see also DE 214,
ND 198). Subjective observations being socially regulated, reﬂection
must involve an analysis of the cognitive faculty in view of its social
conditions. As much as factual material must be traced back to the sub-
ject’s contributions, theory must also always trace the subjective observa-
tions which established the material back to their determinant social
reality. Such an analysis conducts ‘enlightenment . . . [a]s demythologisa-
tion’, which is ‘no longer only . . . reductio ad hominem, but also
inversely . . . reductio hominis’ (ND 187). The analysis aims to ascertain
6 In 1931, Adorno noted: ‘One would seriously have to ask whether realist novels are still
realistic at all: whether the faithful depiction of what appears does not also inadvertently
adopt all that is semblance in that which appears and forgets what it veils; whereas only a
break through the closed context of appearance . . . could . . . unveil the actual . . . reality . . .
[T]his procedure justiﬁes itself only by assimilating itself to social theory’ (VSII 541).
Decades later, Adorno would accuse theory-free positivist social science as unrealistic
realism (S 145).
7 See also Adorno and Horkheimer’s (DE 16) reference to Durkheim and Mauss 1963.
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to what extent factual material is merely grounded in the social conditions
steering subjective reconstructions of reality, rather than representing
reality itself. Simultaneously, theoretical analysis must decipher the social
content hiding inside the object. Knowledge of the object depends on
knowing how the social totality affects it. By combining both operations,
theoretical interpretation unearths from the material its social dimen-
sions. ‘Critique means nothing but the confrontation of a judgement’ –
and ‘[p]erception’ is a ‘rudimentary judgement’ (AE 157) – ‘with the
mediations inherent to it’ (AE 153). Theoretical analysis highlights
those of the material’s elements that are rooted in the social regulation
of subjective observation, instead of representing objective reality, and
those that originated in society’s determination of the object.
Adorno’s Mannheim critique addresses his demand for the ‘correction
of . . . “facts” in the process of theoretical cognition of society’ directly to
sociology. ‘[D]escriptive facts relate’ to society ‘like semblance to reality’.
Sociology requires a conceptual-theoretical framework which can unlock
the material in its social being (VSI 34). In the 1930s, Adorno was
becoming increasingly aware of the resourcefulness of Horkheimer’s
work for his own sociological thinking. Adorno and Horkheimer agreed
that positivism’s fundamental ﬂaws were its orientation on crude facts, its
neglect of their social relativity and its unwillingness to analyse them
theoretically and with a view to social change (A&H1 242–5). Adorno’s
central inspiration (A&H1 322) was Horkheimer’s The Latest Attack
on Metaphysics.8 The early empiricists, Locke and Hume, argues
Horkheimer, still raised the question of the knowing subject’s involve-
ment in science. Recent currents like the Vienna Circle, where ‘veriﬁca-
tion through perception is the Alpha and Omega’ (Horkheimer 1995:
142–3), are unconcerned about it: they disregard the distinction between
facts constructed in subjective observation and reality (1995: 151–2,
155–7).9 Horkheimer defends the theoretical penetration of factual mate-
rial, but adds that such analyses cannot be accomplished by examining the
perceiving subject. The subject’s empirical reconstruction of reality is
directed by concepts, language and ultimately social life (1995: 144–5,
151, 157–60). Hence it must be established to what extent empirical
material is characterised by the social conditions of perception.
Reﬂections upon factual data, Horkheimer concludes, require a theory
of society to access their ‘historical situation’ (1995: 159). Accepting facts
8 Horkheimer’s (1995: 188–243) Traditional and Critical Theory states the following ideas
more lucidly. Adorno read Latest Attack as Horkheimer’s ‘ﬁrst . . ., very authentic’ for-
mulation of ‘our position’ on sociological positivism (A&H4 820–1).
9 Many years later, Adorno repeats this comparison (without citing Horkheimer) (PD 54).
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as truth manifests the ‘inability to grasp what exists as the result of the
social life process in which the individual participates, . . . the estrange-
ment of the product of social labour’ (1995: 156).
A quarter-century later, Adorno reiterated his call for theoretical anal-
ysis in sociology in response to a talk by Popper at the 1961 Tübingen
conference that sparked the ‘positivist dispute’. Adorno’s reply does not
reject Popper’s (PD 87–90) notion that scientiﬁc knowledge is unstable
because cognition proceeds as continuous critique of solutions to prob-
lems, rather than accumulating observations. But the devil is in the detail.
Adorno questions his interlocutor’s view that solutions must be ‘acces-
sible to factual [sachlichen] criticism’. This sounds ‘at least ambiguous’ to
Adorno. Popper implies that theory functions as a set of hypotheses which
must be wholly criticisable with reference to facts, thus granting empirical
material the status of a falsiﬁer which Adorno thinks it does not deserve:
‘facts . . . are not the last thing to which knowledge might attach itself’.10
Adorno would certainly like to see problematic theoretical statements
negated. His method for doing so is immanent critique, the exposure of
ﬂaws within a theoretical framework (PD 112–13). He seldom concedes
that sociological material can falsify theorems. Adorno adds that mutual
critique within the scientiﬁc community, which Popper (PD 95–6) deems
a basis for objectivity, cannot exempt putative sociological knowledge
from theoretical critique either. ‘[S]cientiﬁc thought control’, itself
socially conditioned, motivates Adorno’s suspicion that the ‘critical
impulse is at one with the resistance to the rigid conformity of each
dominant opinion’ (PD 112, see also 29–30).
The judgement that Adorno had no ‘regard for’ Popper’s ‘views’
(Goldstein 2004: 270), or that the two thinkers ‘courteously talked past
one another . . . present[ing] shorthand recapitulations of their positions
on the philosophy of science’ (Wiggershaus 1994: 568; see also Müller-
Doohm 1996: 155), threatens to belittle the subtle intersections between
the talks. Frisby (2004; see also PD xxvii–xxx) offers a more nuanced
reading, explaining why the dispute was so difﬁcult for the disputants to
have and elucidating differences in philosophical grounding as well as
further points of direct contention between Adorno and Popper. This is
not to deny that Adorno’s vision of sociology’s theoretical task from this
period is informed by his epistemological convictions. Sociology, Adorno
10 The ambiguity hinges on Popper’s term sachlich (Adorno, Albert et al. 1989: 105–6),
which resonates with ‘empirical’, ‘factual’ and ‘objective’. Adorno hears mainly empirical
undertones. Indeed, Popper states that problems arise from the ‘discovery’ of ‘contra-
diction[s] . . . between supposed knowledge and . . . facts’ (PD 88) and that the ‘main
function’ of ‘observations . . . is to check and refute . . . our theories’ (PD 299–300).
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maintains, cannot rest with empirical material but ‘requires . . . reﬂection’
(1972: 127): ‘so-called empiry free from theory is . . . merely ideology,
result[ing] . . . in things of the façade’ (PETG 62). The ‘wall’ of facts
before reality ‘can be torn down only by speculative thinking’ (CoM
110). The socialisation of subjective observations and all single social
phenomena ensures that sociological material is ‘structured through
the . . . social totality’ (PD 106). The totality can only be deciphered
theoretically (S 146). Theory is summoned to interpret factual material
with regards to the material’s social dimension and the underlying condi-
tions of capitalism (IS 21–2, SSI 195, 581–2). Thus sociology ‘attempt[s] to
emphasise the mediation of the facts . . . by the whole of society’ (SoI 184).
Adorno invokes the concept of ‘social physiognomy’ once more. It involves
‘interpretation’, ‘becom[ing] aware of the totality in the features of social
givenness’ (PD 32). In advancing socialisation, interpretation is ever more
urgent: ‘the more the particular is deﬁned as a mere object belonging to the
universal . . . the more the so-called facts become a mere cloak veiling what
really exists’ (HF 30).
Liquefaction, reciprocity, perpetual negation The ‘life’ of ‘thought’,
Adorno argues, ‘strikes [einschlägt]’ empirical materials like lightening
(MM 126). By accentuating the material’s social dimension, theory illu-
minates what the material hides. Thus theory spotlights the material’s
inability to reveal of its own accord to what extent it is socially suffused.
Thought dispels the myth that observation and its material faithfully
represent the world and unsettles their claim to truth. Theoretical socio-
logical analysis shows that sociological material cannot disclose social
reality and ‘relativize[s] critically the cognitive value of appearance’ (PD
84). Thought ‘liquef[ies], through the self-reﬂection of science, what has
become congealed through science’ (HTS 73).
Here Adorno’s sociology reveals one of its most problematic conse-
quences. In its attempt to discern the material’s social dimension, theo-
retical analysis encounters a familiar predicament. Social integration
entangles ever more aspects of human and material life in the exchange
relations that make up contemporary society. Although Adorno insists
that the resulting ‘complexity of the apparatus’ and the ‘opa[que]’, ‘over-
powering conditions’ could be deciphered – they are ‘the work of humans
[Menschenwerk]’ (VSI 329) – he seems to think that the socialised soci-
ety’s complexity constitutes a problem. In capitalism, ‘the apparatuses of
production, distribution and domination, as well as economic and social
relations and ideologies are inextricably interwoven’ (ND 264).
Sociology, Adorno warns his students, ‘has to do with an inﬁnitely com-
plex object, even if this object does not confront us in [a] . . . complex
Theoretical analysis in sociology 95
Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Thu Mar 22 14:47:14 GMT 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511686894.004
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012
form’ (IS 83).11 His warning may invite the sceptical reply that the
adaptation of all facets of the world to one form of socially organised
production and distribution should facilitate social research (see PETG
72–3). Yet in adapting the world to contemporary ‘capitalism’, integration
is adapting phenomena to ‘something immensely complicated and . . .
immensely complex’ (PETG 163), recalcitrant to conceptual explication
(PETG 44–5). The task of theoretically investigating individual social
phenomena with reference to this densely interwoven web of social rela-
tions is extremely hard to master.
In another passage, Adorno carefully heeds the possibility that ‘modern
society’ is ‘objectively’ less ‘opaque’ than it seems ‘to sociologists’; that the
‘age of large organisations’ has the ‘tendency’ to remove ‘complex social
mechanisms of mediation’; and that the incomprehensibility of society
may be a ‘projection’ of those no longer able to live independently within it
(SSI 523). Yet even if this is the case – and Adorno hesitates to afﬁrm it – a
further predicament remains. Theoretical analyses would need to relate
the empirical material’s social dimension to society’s historical context: to
interpret the fact in its ‘eminent historicity, its historical implications’, not
‘as something natural’ and ‘unalterable’ (IS 149). Social integration,
which culminates in the reiﬁcation and solidiﬁcation of social life, frus-
trates this endeavour. ‘The more unrelentingly socialisation seizes all
moments of human and interpersonal immediacy, the more impossible
to remember the having-become [das Gewordensein] of the web; the
more irresistible the semblance of nature’ (ND 351). Society hides its
human reality and ‘confronts us as something strange, objectiﬁed, reiﬁed’
(PETG 151). ‘[T]he moment of the non-transparent and opaque . . .
constitutively belongs to the concept of’ a ‘society’ which has come to
operate ‘above the heads of humans’. It is no coincidence, Adorno
repeats, that ‘Durkheim . . . deﬁned the social fact . . . through . . . con-
straint’, ‘equated the blind, collective regularity [Regelhaftigkeit] with the
actual object of sociology’, and, ‘in contradistinction to the teaching of . . .
Weber’, described this object as ‘not “comprehensible”’ (SSI 503). ‘Only
an accomplished theory of society could say what society is’: ‘could’
implies that in 1966, after decades of study, Adorno still feels unable to
do that (S 146). As elaborated in Chapter 1, the most instructive perspec-
tive on exchange society and the single phenomena it regulates attainable
by theory today is a double perspective which holds conﬂicting notions of
society as invariant object and human, historical process in suspense.
11
‘[I]n the web of the through and through socialised humans, an ever larger measure of
structures and contexts confronts the individual no longer as a comprehensible but as an
overwhelming fact’, the authors of Group Experiment explain (GEX 16).
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Adorno’s discussions of estrangement, dependence and integration
proved as thoroughgoing as exchange society proved elusive. Adorno
repeatedly arrives at statements on society such as: ‘both . . . that [all living
things] are under a spell and that they appear to be under a spell, are
probably equally valid’ (HF 173). Given these ‘difﬁculties with really
penetrating present society’ (PETG 12), theoretical interpretations of
the material’s social dimension – of its mediation by the social whole
regulating observations as well as the objects and social phenomena
observed – will currently scarcely be completed and regularly yield incon-
clusive results. Theory can offer perspectives on the data’s social dimen-
sion, on social phenomena governed by exchange society and on exchange
society itself. This allows it to unsettle facts, which obstruct such perspec-
tives. But sociologists face serious obstacles to mastering their analytical
tasks conclusively.12
Hence the investigation must continue. For Adorno, this means abid-
ing by his conviction outlined earlier. Without empirical facts, sociology
would become ‘rampant, unbridled theory’ (IS 25, see also PETG 25).
Sociology must saturate itself anew with material. Yet factual reconstruc-
tions of reality are socially limited. Sociological data are in turn always
subject to the theoretical examination of their social dimension – an
endeavour which is currently unlikely to succeed, so sociologists are
faced with the task of re-engaging with facts once more.
‘The greatest danger threatening this discipline today’, Adorno accord-
ingly cautions his sociology students, ‘is that of becoming polarized . . .
into the mere observation of facts [Tatsachenfeststellung] on the one
hand, and the irresponsible declamation of true or alleged insight into
the essence of things, on the other’ (IS 21–2, see also PETG 105, VSII
644). Adorno sees only one way of avoiding this danger: sociologists must
ensure the interaction between establishing empirical material and its
critical theoretical interpretation (IS 25, 34, SSI 186, 486–7). ‘[W]ithout
a theory of the whole . . . there is no productive individual ﬁnding
[Einzelfeststellung]; without immersion in empiry . . . the truest theory
can degenerate into a delusional system. The tension between both poles
is the vital element of our science’ (VSII 706); ‘their reciprocity
[Wechselwirkung] . . . constitutes the concept of the dialectic’ (IS 25).
This process of ‘relat[ing] to facts’ and ‘mov[ing] by criticizing them’
(MM 126) cannot be interrupted. Observation and theoretical analysis
are incessantly referred to one another.
12 Bonß (1983: 207) describes Adorno’s ‘tentativ[e]’ theoretical penetration and intercon-
nection of seemingly unrelated fragments of social life as ‘experimental testing of theo-
retical outlines [Entwürfe]’.
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A mode of thinking which can neither develop pure thought constructs
nor accept socially limited facts for reality can no longer fulﬁl the demand
for ﬁnal positive knowledge (see also CM 16–17).13 Reﬂections on socio-
logical material certainly offer perspectives on empirical phenomena in
light of their social dimension, and even spotlight aspects of the social
whole. Yet as long as these perspectives remain partial and inconclusive,
theory remains a ‘thought about the results’ which ‘is never . . . a seizable
result’ itself. Sociology must always re-engage with factual material.
However, the material is untrustworthy and hence no sociological result
either: ‘every formulation of a problem in the humanities or social sciences
[geisteswissenschaftliche Problemstellung], be it a statistical diagnosis of
modern sociology, urges, so as to be cognition at all, towards philosoph-
ical theory’ (VSI 354). Faced on one side with inconclusive, even con-
ﬂicting theoretical perspectives and on the other with the socially
conditioned incongruence between reality and its empirical reconstruc-
tion, sociological thought assumes the role of continuously exposing those
conﬂicts and this incongruence. Thought moves through repeatedly
exhibiting the gap between concept and reality by negating the claim of
factual reconstructions to represent reality trustworthily and by exposing
the contradictions of theoretical analyses of empirical phenomena gov-
erned by exchange society. ‘[U]nderstanding and interpreting’, Adorno
states, ‘entails negation’ (HF 134). In sociology, it entails the simulta-
neous critical negation of empirical material and theoretical statements.
Sociology is neither conclusive theory nor grounded in facts and ﬁgures. It
is relentless demythologisation.
Perpetual negation generates ‘consciousness of non-identity’ (ND 17).
Non-identity, Adorno speciﬁes, designates that ‘concept and . . . thing . . .
are not one’ (HTS 70–1, NLII 63). One ormore properties of reality elude
its conception, or reality lacks properties its conception ascribes to it.
Negation as recognition of non-identity highlights ‘the impossibility of
capturing in subjective concepts without surplus what is not of the subject’
(AE 147). Evidently, non-identity thinking yields little by way of positive
knowledge. Adorno admits that negative, unpositionedmeditations cause
vertigo (ND 42).14 Yet he is convinced that as long as reﬂection can
exhibit cognitive failures, including the social limitations of factual
13 Group Experiment, Adorno emphasises, is not called ‘experiment’ for nothing (GS9.2
378).
14 Adorno’s 1966 concessionmight have beenmotivated by a conversation with Kracauer in
1960: ‘I told Teddie that many of his articles . . . made me just dizzy; that I had often the
feeling that other interpretations might be as conclusive . . . I traced . . . my dizziness to the
fact that he seemingly deals in substances without, however, actually being attached to any
substance. Hence the arbitrariness, the lack of orientation’ (A&K 514).
98 Sociological reﬂection
Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Thu Mar 22 14:47:14 GMT 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511686894.004
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012
reconstructions of reality and the shortcomings and conﬂicts of theoretical
analyses, the assertion of non-identity is imperative.
Experiencing society ‘That is little enough’, to use a phrase
Adorno (MCP 125) borrows from Bloch (2000: 165). The ‘whole
demand of cognition . . . does not consist in mere perceiving, classifying,
and calculating but precisely in the determining negation of the respec-
tively immediate’ (DE 20). Yet theory provides few positive results.
Adorno’s reﬂections on the sociology of exchange society, which simul-
taneously takes place in this society, unearth severe problems from its
theoretical dimension. Nevertheless, theoretical analysis has the
capacity to sharpen sociology’s focus on social reality. The reciprocity
between empirical observation and theoretical interpretation enables
sociology to obtain perspectives on phenomena in relation to exchange
society and on exchange society itself which are beyond the reach of
empirical observation, notwithstanding that these perspectives are open
to further scrutiny.
Theoretical negation creates a further opportunity for greater aware-
ness of society. Analyses of the material’s social dimension suggest that
society is a force governing subjective thought and the objective world.
Reaching for perspectives on phenomena in their social mediation and on
the ‘total system’ (PD 32) manifesting in facts, theory also highlights that
without interpretation, the material’s social dimension remains opaque.
Theory negates the identity – exposes the non-identity – of factual recon-
structions and reality. By unsettling facts as ﬂawed because they fail to
represent social reality adequately, negation stresses that society holds
power over all subjects and objects as well as remaining intangible to
immediate observation. Critical thought generates the experience of the
‘[i]mpenetrability and strangeness of the whole . . . which lies beyond the
grasp of immediate . . . experience’ (P 89). The subject gains conscious-
ness of exchange society in its closely integrated, frozen state, in which it
befalls individuals as omnipresent yet intangible essence. The experience
of the contradiction between conceptions of reality and reality involves an
experience of the strange and solid world surrounding humans. That is
little enough, but it is not nothing.
So little is it, though, that even the experience of society qua impene-
trable instance is unacceptable as a conclusion. ‘[T]he essential laws of
society . . . are more real than the factual, within which they appear and
which deceptively conceals them’, but society is neither absolute, nor
intransigent. The ‘essential laws . . . shed the conventional attributes of
their essentiality [Wesenhaftigkeit]’. Only where negation can proceed
to dispute society’s essentiality can it keep contributing to a proper
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awareness of exchange society. Here negation reaches the limits of its
services to sociology. Disputing the equation of society and essence is
not enough: society’s ‘essential laws . . . would have to be named as the
negativity, which makes the world the way that it is, brought to its
concept’ (ND 171). Society would have to be deciphered as an ‘antag-
onistic structure’ consisting of ‘relationships which are reiﬁed and
nevertheless [relationships] of living subjects’. ‘Where social experience
perceives domination’, for instance, ‘the historical explanation of the
latter is the task of critical theory’ (SSI 194). Sociology cannot but
continue its inquiries into exchange society in close touch with empirical
material and in view of its social dimension. ‘The estrangement of living
humans from the reiﬁed social powers could be penetrated only by a
theory which derives this estrangement itself from the social conditions’
(VSII 676).
Ultimately, sociological theory aims to fulﬁl a demand Horkheimer
and Adorno raise for cognition generally: to decipher empirical mate-
rials ‘as mediated conceptual moments which are only fulﬁlled by
revealing their social, historical, human meaning’ (DE 20). The sub-
jective contributions to establishing empirical material would have to
be read as human activity in speciﬁc social conditions. The condi-
tions regulating subjective observation – prima vista invisible and
initially emerging as essential – are not ‘ahistorically identical, tran-
scendental, but . . . changing and historically comprehensible’
(Adorno 1977: 125). Moreover, theory must decipher society inside
the single social phenomenon – unobservable and initially experi-
enced as petriﬁed objectivity – as the human product that it is, and
‘test . . . insights into essence [Wesenseinsichten] against the . . . his-
torical conditions under which the phenomenon . . . has come into
being’ (IS 22). The ideas covered in this chapter provide more depth
on the theoretical tasks of sociology compared with the considera-
tions in Chapter 1. What re-emerges as sociologically instructive in
this context, though, is precisely the double perspective – correspond-
ent with sociology’s double character – of society as a petriﬁed,
reiﬁed, estranged authority which is nonetheless the work of humans
and historically transformable.
Theory in sociological research
It is not immediately evident how the methodological considerations
above translate into social research practice. A better grasp of the theo-
retical dimension of Adorno’s sociology hinges on understanding the
operation of theoretical analysis in his sociological investigations of
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speciﬁc social phenomena. Several of Adorno’s works illustrate this oper-
ation. The next two sections draw upon writings from 1938 to 1953 and
from the 1960s respectively. This distinction is not primarily chronologi-
cally motivated, but reﬂects differences in the ways in which theoretical
analysis manifests itself in the two bodies of text.
Reﬂections on mass culture
Chapter 2 saw Adorno’s American sociology draw materials from various
empirical sources. Regardless of their source, Adorno deems such factual
reconstructions untrustworthy because they conceal their social dimen-
sion. The following passages illustrate his corresponding efforts to discern
the sociological material’s social dimension with the help of the concepts
informing his theory of exchange society. By revealing what the material
conceals, theory not only suggests new perspectives on social life but also
unsettles the claim of facts to being sound representations of reality.
Theorising radio Adorno’s involvement in Lazarsfeld’s 1930s
radio research highlights the impact of his concern with theoretical anal-
ysis on his sociology. The fact that Adorno was ‘simply too theoretical’
(Jenemann 2007: 18) by Lazarsfeld’s standards seems to have contributed
signiﬁcantly to the well-known frictions between the two émigrés. Adorno
had crafted theoretical frames around musico-sociological questions
(1991a: 29–60), intending to employ them in the project’s investigations
of radio and listener reactions (CM 218). Lazarsfeld (1941: 2–8)
embraced ‘administrative research’. This involved empirical research on
which types of audiences – given certain attributes, predispositions, hab-
its, circumstances etc. – consumed different media and their contents.
Administrative research also sought to observe how media contents were
received: whether broadcasts were liked or disliked, how they were under-
stood and responded to, or how they affected people’s thinking and
behaviour. Such studies were often conducted at the behest of agencies
seeking to use radio, newspapers or other media to inﬂuence the public.
Though a self-described ‘European positivist’, Lazarsfeld (1941: 14–16;
1968: 271, 322–6) had sympathy for the concerns of Horkheimer’s
‘Frankfurt group’. He wished for co-operation between critical and
administrative sociology, especially between Adorno’s theoretical work
and empirical research, hoping that the conceptual frames could help in
gathering and elucidating data. Adorno found that the sociology he was to
contribute to thus granted theory merely a ‘supplementary’ role, render-
ing it obsolete once the data were obtained. He could not assent to this
(CM 223, 227–8, see also CoM 477). Adorno’s objective was a critical
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theoretical examination of factual materials, not conceptual guidance for
their collection and clariﬁcation.15
Adorno’s ‘radio physiognomics’ begins to ﬂesh out this vision. Both
radio music and listener reactions, Adorno argues, are socially mediated.
Radio music is a commodity: the impact of compositional standardisation
(1941: 17–24; 1945: 210–12, 216–17), repetitive ‘plugging’ (1941: 27–
32) and radio technology (1938: 23–4, 28; 1945: 209; 1979) on music
must be understood in relation to the socially dominant exchange princi-
ple. This is consistent with Adorno’s conviction that productive forces are
fettered by social relations (see also CoM 60–1). Standardised, relent-
lessly plugged, commodiﬁed music, he adds, is met with complete recog-
nition, automatic reactions and ‘commodity listening’, e.g. the
exaggerated fascination with priceless instruments or the focus on a series
of gustatory passages instead of intellectually active experiences of inte-
grated artistic wholes (1941: 21–4, 32–7; 1945: 211–15). Sociologists
gathering empirical material on listeners must simultaneously ask ‘in
how far . . . subjective reactions of test-persons are . . . spontaneous and
immediate . . ., or in how far there stand behind them . . . the dissemination
mechanisms and the apparatus’s power of suggestion, . . . the objective
implications of the media and the material with which the listeners are
confronted – and ultimately widely overarching social structures up to that
of the whole of society’ (CM 220).
No ‘treatment of superﬁcial data’ can unveil the ‘moving forces’ behind
them (CoM 110). Only theoretical analyses of the material allow sociol-
ogists ‘to understand [listeners] better than they understand themselves’
(1945: 216, see also 1938: 4) and radio better than the facts present it.
‘Nothing . . . is “too far-fetched” . . . [T]he more [our statements] tran-
scend the limited and immediate situation and consistently relate it to
basic social conditions, the more valuable they are’ (CoM 103). Music
consumption, Adorno speculates for instance, furthers social integration:
pop music’s ‘soporiﬁc’ effect distracts listeners from the workday and the
economic threats they constantly face; spare-time relaxation is meant to
reproduce their labour capacity for capitalist production; and the illusion
of free choice covers up the consumers’ misery in social dependence
(1941: 37–9; 1945: 212, 216). According to Adorno’s ‘social phenome-
nology’ of standardised hit songs (CM 226), listeners have been trained to
prefer the largely major- and minor-related tonal make-up of the music of
their childhood surroundings. The industry imitated these musical pat-
terns. Once a song was commercially successful, its model was incessantly
15 On Adorno’s relationship with Lazarsfeld and the rise of administrative research in the
USA, see Jenemann 2007: 1–46; see also Morrison 1978; Rose 1978: 97–9.
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repeated and became the frozen standard for all hit compositions. The
songs’ superﬁcial, schematic ‘pseudo-individualisations’ keep music
within those naturalised boundaries of marketability, while nonetheless
offering listeners, who would punish lack of variety with slackening con-
sumption, stimuli they perceive as new (1941: 22–6). Plugging – the
glamorous presentation and replaying of songs, ‘pseudo-expert’ dis-
courses on styles and musicians etc. – further ensures that even stand-
ardised music is not forgotten the minute it is heard (1941: 27–32). Most
of these perspectives on radio phenomena are established by theoretical
examinations of the data’s hidden social dimension. ‘[S]ticking to the
facts’ would be ‘illusory’ (CoM 104–5).16
Analysing fascism In 1943, after parting ways with Lazarsfeld,
Adorno was still investigating radio material, but his attention had shifted
to content analyses of Martin Luther Thomas’s speeches. The study was
part of Adorno’s reaction to the politics of the day. In mid-1930s
California, Thomas had ‘attempted to launch a religiously framed, polit-
ically oriented fascist organization . . . “the Christian American Crusade”’
(Cavalletto 2007: 133). As the following two examples illustrate, the
Thomas project, too, was informed by Adorno’s efforts to penetrate the
untrustworthy factual surface theoretically and scrutinise the rhetorical
stimuli in view of typical reactions and underlying social dimensions (see
CM 237).17
The study’s ﬁrst part investigates the appeal of Thomas’s self-
characterisation, e.g. his self-portrayal as a ‘great little man’, powerful
and grand yet impecunious and petty. Adorno explores the allure of this
image in relation to the listeners’ psyche in capitalism. Listeners are
attracted to the great moneyless man, because in the distressing condi-
tions of dependence and estrangement, where people deem themselves at
the mercy of ‘huge blind economic forces’, hearing that even grand
personalities face economic insecurities reduces the shamefulness of
their own. The orator’s appeal for cash further gratiﬁes individuals,
because they imagine that despite their exigencies they can support some-
one signiﬁcant. Under the illusion that greatness and littleness cohere,
even the poor feel ‘elevated’ (GS9.1 28–33).
Adorno revisited the ‘great little man’ image in subsequent years, each
time with a slightly different analytical emphasis. A 1949 piece points out
that the agitator posing as a friendly neighbour takes advantage of people’s
16 See Jenemann 2007: 47–104, for a detailed discussion of Adorno’s radio research.
17 Apostolidis (2000: 71–89) and Cavalletto (2007: 127–71) provide elaborate discussions.
See especially Cavalletto’s (2007: 155–67) notion of ‘theorizing by elucidation’.
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desire for ‘genuine relationships’ in an industrialised society where ‘tech-
niﬁcation and specialization disrupt’ interpersonal relations (VSI 283–4).
Amore elaborate 1951 study reconﬁgures the problem in Freudian terms.
Since in current conditions the subject cannot fulﬁl its ‘ego demands’,
narcissistic love is precarious. This triggers a displacement of libido: it is
no longer the ego, nor the ego-ideal, but the idealised leader, who receives
a large part of the energy formerly nourishing self-love.18 The ‘great little
man’ attracts this energy: his putative grandeur makes him loveable with-
out frustration; his ostensible similarity with his petty listeners allows
them to reconcile their remaining traces of self-love with their love for
him (SSI 419–21). Identiﬁcations among listeners subsequently establish
a group following (SSI 417). The leader’s followers identify with each
other on the basis of sharing the replacement of their ego ideals with the
same leader image (SSI 419; Freud 1955: 107–8, 116).
In another passage of the Thomas study, Adorno’s quest for critical
analysis pushes beyond sociology’s methodological and substantive
dimension. Thomas, Adorno (GS9.1 114–15, see also SSI 401) empha-
sises, almost exclusively presents ‘opaque, isolated . . . images of facts’.
The agitator knows that if he engaged in ‘consequent, coherent and
consistent thinking’, namely ‘autonomous logical processes’, he would
not only offer a basis for challenging him to ‘those at whom [he] wants to
strike’, but also defy the incoherent, ‘unrelated . . . facts’ he presents, and
he would threaten to undermine his message. Adorno implies that theo-
retically scrutinising factual material is not a purely sociologico-
methodological issue, but that his readers are to reﬂect upon whatever
they are fed as data in their own everyday lives. Critical scrutiny of
empirical immediacy supports people’s political resistance to fascist prop-
aganda.19 Adorno, the persecutee in 1943, does not have the luxury of
doubting the necessity of such resistance.
Psychological and sociological concepts also guided Adorno’s involve-
ment in the research for The Authoritarian Personality. In determining
personality trends and corresponding ‘give-away items’ – the very pre-
condition for conducting the empirical study – researchers considered
extant data as well as theoretical work (CM 234). For instance, the notion
that items expressing ‘superstition’ indicated a weak ego which has given
up on intervening in overpowering conditions and shifted responsibility to
‘outside forces beyond one’s control’ (AP 236) was informed by psycho-
logical and social theory. Yet not even the laboriously established data of
18 See Freud 1955: 109–13, 129–30; 1957: 93–4, 99–100.
19 The statement ‘thinking per se refuses to become . . . a tool’ (GS9.1 114) constitutes an
early formulation of a point that would be signiﬁcant to Negative Dialectics (ND 30).
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The Authoritarian Personality were trusted as representations of reality.
Only theoretical interpretations could access the material’s hidden psy-
chological and social dimensions. ‘[I]ntended as an empirical investiga-
tion’, the study, Adorno (SoI 185) states retrospectively, eventually
conﬂicted with the rules of empirical research due to its strong speculative
tendencies. For Adorno, it was precisely its theoretical foray into the
hidden dimensions of the psychological facts that rendered the project
richer in socio-psychological and sociological insights than efforts limited
to empirical procedures and materials.
The Authoritarian Personality’s ‘interpretations’, Jahoda (1954: 12)
emphasises, ‘are performed in terms of psychoanalytic theory’. Turner
(2002: 155–8) argues that Adorno treats historical-material conditions
underlying the respondents’ attitudinal patterns as mere background,
instead of critically analysing them. Bauman (2000: 152–3) makes a
similar point. Indeed, the study’s authors repeatedly warn that their
inquiry into personality has yielded only limited insights into social reality
(AP 608, 661, 972–6).20 Yet it is relevant for this sociological discussion
that in several passages Adorno does attempt to decipher the data’s social
dimension. Anti-Semitic prejudice, including the distinction ‘good
Jew/bad Jew’ (AP 622–7), he holds, is unrelated to the characteristics of
the Jews (AP 609). Stereotypy is a ‘means for pseudo-orientation in an
estranged world’ (AP 622, see also 608). The opacity of contemporary
capitalism, which deﬁes people’s critical-analytical scrutiny, fosters their
ignorance about, and lack of interest in, political matters (AP 658–63;
see also Buck-Morss 1977: 183–4). Individuals tackle their confusionwith
misleading intellectual compasses, which also include political stereo-
types (AP 662–9), blaming bureaucrats for all ills (AP 693–5) or ascribing
an unrealistic degree of power to politicians (AP 669–71).21 This latter
issue of ‘personalisation’, a subjective device for ‘re-translat[ing] the
abstract and impenetrable character of’ social relations and conditions
‘into . . . living experience’, recurs frequently in Adorno’s later sociological
work (SSI 188, see also CM 63, OL 426, PETG 59–61). One of
The Authoritarian Personality’s central sociological ﬁndings is summarised
thus: ‘The objectiﬁcation of social processes, their obedience to intrinsic
supra-individual laws, seems to result in an intellectual alienation of the
individual from society. This alienation is experienced by the individual as
20 It is another matter to have The Authoritarian Personality suggest Adorno’s retreat from
Marxist social analysis, especially since in 1940s America he probably felt under political
pressure to veil his Marxist orientation (Rubin 2002: 173–4).
21 Low ‘fascism’-scorers – Adorno seems to see his political point reinforced – tend to reject
labels and reﬂect on their personal perceptions of the world (AP 644–52).
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disorientation, with the concomitant fear and uncertainty . . . [S]tereotypy
and personalization can be understood as devices for overcoming this
uncomfortable state of affairs’ (AP 618). The ‘industrial standardization
of innumerable phenomena of modern life’, Adorno adds, partly explains
why ‘stereotypical thinking’ is so common today (AP 665). Here society’s
quasi-autonomous operation, social petrifaction, estrangement and
the homogenising force of commodity exchange are foregrounded as
conditions for the respondents’ attitudes. This is consistent with
Adorno’s critical theory of capitalism – outlined in Chapter 1 and revisited
in Chapter 4 below – as a coagulated, estranged totality generating con-
fusion and fear, and as an encompassing context of exchange relations
adjusting thought to the identity principle. Transforming the potentially
fascist personality, the authors conclude, hinges on ‘chang[ing] . . . the
total organization of society’ (AP 975).
Stars under scrutiny During 1952–3, Adorno worked for the
Californian Hacker Foundation. The foundation was linked to a clinic
interested in psychiatric, psychological and socio-psychological research,
which Adorno sought to ‘accentuat[e] . . . sociologically’ (GS9.2 11).
Adorno’s main production was the aforementioned qualitative content
analysis of astrology, focused on the stars column of the ‘right wing’ Los
Angeles Times (SDE 56). Like earlier studies, Adorno’s interpretations of
the texts employed psychoanalytical and sociological concepts – including
his theory of the culture industry (DE 94–136) and occultism (SDE 172–
80) – for tackling the data’s hidden social dimension.
A selection of passages illustrates this.22 Although, Adorno concedes,
the column’s astral ideology is ultimately irrational, people’s ‘susceptibil-
ity’ to it ‘is kept awake by certain social and psychological conditions’
(SDE 49). The blindly reproduced, reiﬁed, solidiﬁed whole of capitalism
generates the experience of society as arbitrary, daunting fate. Reading
astrology molliﬁes this experience. The projection of the fateful social
system onto the stars lends it ‘higher . . . dignity and justiﬁcation’, while
‘the idea that the stars, if one only reads them correctly, offer some advice,
mitigates the . . . fear of the inexorability of social processes’ (SDE 57–8).
The narcissist is particularly excited by this. ‘To him, astrology, just as
other irrational creeds like racism, provides a short cut by bringing the
complex to a handy formula and offering . . . the pleasant gratiﬁcation that
he who feels . . . excluded from educational privileges nevertheless belongs
to the minority of those . . . “in the know”’ (SDE 61).
22 Bernstein (in Adorno 1991a: 12–16) andWitkin (2003: 68–82) discuss further aspects of
the study’s substance.
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The ‘promise of help . . . granted by a superhuman agency’ also ameli-
orates the misery of the socially ‘dependent, who ﬁnd themselves inces-
santly in situations which they cannot cope with by their own powers’
(SDE 74). The column’s ‘soothing overtone . . . reassure[s] the reader . . .
that “everything will be ﬁne,” overcoming his apprehensions by establish-
ing some magical conﬁdence in the good turn of events’ (SDE 76). Extra
gratiﬁcation ensues from astrology’s message that solving the predica-
ments of life is exclusively up to the individual and his observation of the
stars’ – often practical, ‘down to earth’ (see SDE 72–3) – advice on how to
deal with himself in the world (SDE 78–9). Astrology is by no means the
harmless aberration it may appear to be at ﬁrst sight: by giving the status
quo ideological legitimacy, the astrology column encourages readers to
adapt and to integrate.
Adorno’s theoretical analysis of the hidden social dimension of a range
of further items reveals that promoting conformity constitutes astrology’s
‘over-all rule’ (SDE 80). The column’s temporal dimension is particularly
effective. Exchange society requires individuals to function both as work-
ers and as consumers. Astrology offers its readers a biphasic guide –
purportedly attuned to a cosmic rhythm – for reconciling these antino-
mies. Work tasks, especially putatively necessary but senseless chores,
atone for pleasure and are assigned to the a.m.; play and pleasure reward
work and are assigned to the p.m. Readers gladly accept this orientation
device as a natural reference point. Their performance for exchange is
secured: the a.m./p.m. plan neither allows production to spoil consump-
tion nor consumption to distract from production’s meaningless
machine-like operations (SDE 89–101).
On closer scrutiny, however, the formulaic astral prescription of various
modes of happiness only permits pleasure that ‘serves . . . some ulterior
purpose of . . . self promotion’ (SDE 101). A jolly appearance conduces to
being deemed successful; attending parties, sprees and trips expands
one’s network; accepting invitations (whether you like it or not) serves
to maintain one’s status; even romances can push one’s career. Just like
the functional orgies in Huxley’s novel ensnare individuals in the appara-
tus of the Brave New World (SDE 102–3), fun, although a p.m. activity,
serves a.m.’s labour and unites the subject with society’s productivist
imperative.
These passages display Adorno’s doubts that sociological material
discloses its social dimension and his efforts to scrutinise data as symp-
toms of social tendencies with the help of his theory of exchange society’s
weightiest aspects: solidiﬁcation, estrangement, dependence, integra-
tion, exchange principle (SDE 153–66). Shedding light on what the
material hides, these theoretical analyses persistently unsettle its
Theory in sociological research 107
Downloaded from Cambridge Books Online by IP 158.143.192.135 on Thu Mar 22 14:47:14 GMT 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511686894.004
Cambridge Books Online © Cambridge University Press, 2012
cognitive value. In the ﬁnal section of his study, Adorno states: ‘just as
adherents of philosophical empiricism seem to be more susceptible for
organized secondary superstition than speculative thinkers, extreme
empiricism, teaching absolute obedience of the mind to given data,
“facts,” has no principle such as the idea of reason, by which to distin-
guish the possible from the impossible’. A ‘mentality’ develops which is
‘often no longer able to resist mythological temptations’ (SDE 158).
Adorno associates the social researcher’s trust in empirical data, con-
ceived as an uncritical belief in factual reconstructions which hide their
social dimension, with the superstitious view of the world in terms of
astral ‘facts’, which Adorno has also just presented as glossing over social
trends. His sociological work in America thus closes with an intensely
provocative appeal to mistrust socially limited sociological data and
examine them theoretically.
The theoretical dimension of ‘Stars Down to Earth’ underlines why
‘content analysis’ is no misnomer for Adorno’s sociological engage-
ment with texts. His empirical treatment of documents seems more
afﬁnitive with the procedures of discourse analysis. Language, dis-
course analysts emphasise, is no mere epiphenomenon but a form of
social action (Gill 2000: 174–5). Even astrological writings, Adorno
concurs, fulﬁl important psychological and social functions. What
discourse analysts tend to deny, however, is that texts can be ‘a
pathway to some other reality’ (Gill 2000: 175). They insist on
studying ‘the text in its own right’ (Gill 2000: 177). Content analysts,
by contrast, regard texts not only as inﬂuencing the social world, but
simultaneously as a ‘medium of expression’ of prevalent ‘worldviews,
values, attitudes, opinions, prejudices and stereotypes’ (Bauer 2000:
133–4). Content analysis means analysing these contexts through
texts. Adorno treats astrological literature as an expression of the
intellectual and social conditions of commodity capitalism. The
sociological analysis of texts involves ascertaining these conditions,
which, albeit produced and reproduced by human actions, including
speaking and writing, have come to operate as if they were independ-
ent. Social conditions shape these human actions in turn.
Results or reciprocity? Vis-à-vis capitalist conditions recalcitrant
to decipherment, theoretical assertions, Adorno warns, must be viewed
with circumspection. By tackling the material’s social dimension, theo-
retical analysis unsettles the material and provides instructive perspectives
on phenomena in social mediation and on exchange society. But these
perspectives are rarely exhaustive of the matter and often resist reconcili-
ation. Theory does not amount to a satisfactory explanation or conclusive
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decryption of social phenomena. Their investigation must continue. This
means conducting further empirical research, engaging with new mate-
rial, which demands theoretical scrutiny in turn. Theory and observation
enter into a reciprocal relation.
It is difﬁcult to identify this trajectory in Adorno’s American sociology.
His interpretations appear to claim an unwarranted degree of deﬁniteness,
glossing over the problems of theoretical sociological analysis presented
by his methodological work. Relentlessly critical of sociological material,
Adorno’s interpretations, it seems, do not then enter into a reciprocal
relation with new data. He deciphers new material with his established
analytical frameworks or new ideas. But instances where he fundamen-
tally challenges his theoretical assertions before proceeding to re-engage
with new data appear to be rare. His theoretical assertions read like state-
ments fancying themselves as representations of the material’s ﬁnal truth
in the form of a theory of exchange society. In the Thomas study, psycho-
analytic and particularly social theory certainly had ‘primacy’ over the
material (Cavalletto 2007: 164–5). Adorno’s radio writings even contain a
list of ‘axioms’ about capitalist commodity society (1945: 210–11). Did
Adorno grant theoretical assertions the status of conclusions – perhaps
in reaction to an American scientiﬁc milieu which he felt (CM 242)
overvalued empirical material and downgraded theory to refutable
hypotheses?
This question requires a careful critical response. Adorno denies that
his analyses have reached conclusions and states the need for continued
investigation in relation to all the studies discussed. The radio writings are
described as ‘models’ for further empirical inquiry. New material could
‘correct’ – whereby he seems to mean ‘reﬁne’ rather than ‘falsify’ – ‘the
theorems’ (CM 227). Thus Adorno at least intended to stay true to his
announcement to Lazarsfeld (A&H2 427) that the ‘dialectical method’
would maintain ‘a reciprocal relation’ – an ‘interdependence’ (1938: i),
‘interw[eaving]’ (1938: 6) or ‘interplay’ (CoM 446) – between theory and
empirical research. The Thomas study, reports Adorno’s wife, was also
never regarded as exhaustive or conclusive. I mentioned the different
theoretical perspectives on the ‘great little man’ Adorno held over the
years. He might have denied that they amount to a complete theoretical
framework. Adorno, Gretel Adorno continues, understood the study of
the Thomas transcripts as a text-based counterpart of The Authoritarian
Personality (A&H4 758), which continues investigations on the basis of
new empirical inquiries into subjects. The Authoritarian Personality’s theo-
retical considerations, the authors caution, should not be read as conclu-
sive either – even if they appear plain – but ‘as hypotheses for further
research’ (AP 604). For Bonß (1983: 215), they are not ‘results’ but
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‘“open” offers of interpretation [Interpretationsangebote]’: ‘uncertain
and preliminary’, but capable of providing new ‘perspective[s]’. ‘Stars
Down to Earth’ might be read as investigations of some of the theoretical
ideas informing Adorno’s earlier studies on fascism and stereotypy with
reference to new – namely textual – data (see Crook in SDE 13–24).23 The
astrology piece’s ‘results’, too, ‘must by necessity be regarded as tenta-
tive’, awaiting more empirical material, especially on readers (SDE 54).24
Given Adorno’s denials that his theoretical assertions are ﬁnal and plans
to conduct further empirical research, it might be wrong to construe that
he intended those assertions as conclusions, inconsistent with his meth-
odological warnings of the precariousness of theoretical reﬂections on,
and in, exchange society. Nonetheless, many theoretical statements in
Adorno’s American sociology, articulating his perspectives on phenom-
ena in their social mediation and on the social whole, ring as conclusive.
This seems to be partly due to the fact that most of his plans to re-examine
the theoretical problems persistently with reference to new data remained
unrealised. As a result, some criticisms of this part of Adorno’s oeuvre are
hard to dismiss. Witkin (2003: 117) complains that Adorno’s radio
research ultimately mainly ‘illustrated his theory’.25 Kellner (2002: 99–
103) argues that Adorno’s failure to consider artefacts of oppositional
subcultures from outside the culture industry, which express rebellion
over conformity, render his theoretical interpretations of popular music
one-sided. For Hyman and Sheatsley (1954: 102), Adorno’s analytical
sections in The Authoritarian Personality exempt ‘judgements’ from ‘sci-
entiﬁc restraint’ and let the theoretical ‘diagnoses’ run ‘rampant’. Crook
(SDE 25–8) questions the value of Adorno’s statements on listener and
reader reactions because they are based on studies of radio speeches and
astrological literature, rather than of listeners and readers,26 and notes
Adorno’s neglect of the gender dimensions of those reactions due to his
overreliance on Freudian theory.
A sociology in which theory is inconclusive and requires renewed
confrontation with data which are always limited and subject to renewed
23 Group Experiment could also be seen as developing ideas from Adorno’s earlier fascism
research in relation to new data.
24 Wiggershaus’s (1994: 458) criticism that Adorno ‘did not mention any objective data’ is
misleading. Adorno regarded the column’s text as empirical –which is what Wiggershaus
appears to mean by ‘objective’ – data. Strictly speaking, for Adorno data are never
‘objective’ but untrustworthy subjective reconstructions (see Bonß 1983: 209).
25 Lazarsfeld’s (A&H2 436) accusation that Adorno ‘disregard[ed] . . . evidence’ is problem-
atic: for Adorno, nothing empirical is evidence, neither as veriﬁcation (e.g. PD 69) nor as
falsiﬁcation of theory. Adorno sometimes (AP 603)mentions empirical data as ‘evidence’,
but clearly does not treat them as such.
26 See also Honneth 1991: 81, and Cavalletto 2007: 167.
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theoretical critique has difﬁculties offering positive results. Although
some of Adorno’s American sociological writings read as if theory did
not face these difﬁculties, occasional emphases on negation are notice-
able. His radio research, Adorno cautions, is an ‘experiment in theory’
(1938: 2). Some media analysts answer the question how radio, music
and listeners interact by claiming that radio brings high culture to ever
more people (1979: 110–13). Adorno’s ‘The Radio Symphony’ presents
no comprehensive alternative result. He makes the speciﬁc point
that radio transmission – and repetition ‘ad nauseam’ (1972: 128) –
transforms symphonic music and its reception (1979: 113–35). This
enables Adorno mainly to challenge the conclusion that radio is an
adequate means of fostering conscious experiences of the original
works and to question the power of empirical records of listener
reactions to underpin that conclusion (1979: 112, 135–9). A Social
Critique of Radio Music chieﬂy proposes a rival approach to administra-
tive research. Administrative research answers questions like ‘How can
radio bring good music to large numbers of people?’ with reference to
data on listener responses to stimuli. Adorno steers clear of answering
this question. Since radio transmission infringes on ‘good music’; and
since in capitalist conditions, where music is commodiﬁed, the masses,
socialised into commodity listening, are incapable of genuinely experi-
encing ‘good music’ (1945: 208–11), the very possibility to achieve the
stated aim is in doubt. His radio writings, Adorno explains, focus on
negating the ‘untrue image’ of music on the radio and exposing the social
conditions of this ‘untruth’ (CM 226). The Authoritarian Personality’s
‘gain’ lies not in the ‘absolute conclusiveness of its positive insights’
either, ‘but primarily in the conception of the problem’. It is a ‘pilot
study’, ‘explor[ing] . . . possibilities’ rather than offering ‘irrefutable
results’ (CM 235). Horkheimer’s (1985: 263) statement that his friend’s
‘sociological research . . . contravenes empiricism no less than conclusive
theory’ is perhaps one-sided, but it captures some of the orientation of
this research.
Adorno’s work in the USA between 1938 and 1953 is commonly read
as his most exemplary sociological output. The American studies dem-
onstrate Adorno’s engagement with, and simultaneous distrust in, empir-
ical material as well as showing his efforts to theoretically scrutinise the
data’s social dimension and undermine their cognitive status with the help
of his theory of exchange society. However, these writings are not themost
striking illustrations of the reciprocity and negativity of sociological anal-
ysis he was shown to envision above. For more thoroughgoing illustra-
tions of the theoretical-analytical procedure in social research – including
the elements of reciprocity and negativity – outlined in Adorno’s
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methodological writings, one must turn to works that are less often
deemed central to his sociological oeuvre.
The rhythm of analysis
Adorno sees his writings as resistant to résumé (SSI 574).27 The following
discussions do not aim for summaries. Many of Adorno’s arguments are
so multifaceted and dependent on how he articulates them that synopsis
runs the risk of covering up substantive complexity.28 The objective is to
consider another selection of Adorno’s 1960s Critical Models to illustrate a
speciﬁc aspect of his late sociology. The focus will be on highlighting how
these texts manifest – more comprehensively than the American pieces –
the elements of theoretical analysis discussed above: its role and modus
operandi, its reciprocity and negativity, its experiential potential and its
problems. Yet illustration is impossible without some engagement with
the texts’ argumentative contents, which, if it is not to distract from this
discussion’s thematic focus, must be synoptic. I hope to counterbalance
the unavoidable disadvantages of condensing Adorno’s argumentation by
exposing a less transparent layer of these writings: the unswerving oper-
ation – underneath the web of diverse substantive points – of a persistent
analytical strategy for sociological examinations of exchange society.
Analytical models In 1965, asked to contribute to a radio pro-
gramme, Adorno wrote ‘On the Question: “What Is German?”’The critic
of stereotypy would not have asked this question himself – it was set by the
station (CM 312). Instead of trying to resolve it, Adorno replies by
mercilessly problematising it. More precisely put, Adorno treats the ques-
tion as well as the facts putatively justifying and answering it as empirical
material demanding investigation. This is consistent with the trend in his
late sociology to draw material from personal encounters with social life’s
details. Of course, personal encounters do not escape the social limita-
tions of observation either. Their materials bear hidden a characteristic
twofold social dimension. Adorno seeks to analyse this dimension with the
help of his theory of exchange society.
Adorno cannot even begin to reply to the question ‘What is German?’
without reﬂecting on the social conditions of reifying consciousness in
their impact on the question and on the subject’s answer. Both, he argues,
adhere to typically capitalist identity thinking: the question by invoking a
German essence subsuming the supposed nation’s people, any answer by
27 This is partly why Adorno is so hard to criticise (Kellner 2002: 105).
28 See Chapter 5.
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stereotyping. Such thought easily progresses towards a dangerous ‘collec-
tive narcissism’, idealising the in-group and denouncing the out-group
(CM 205–6). The very possibility of pinpointing speciﬁcally German
traits is thus suspicious.
Images of German uniqueness, Adorno continues, often highlight the
nation’s intellectual excellence and its people’s reputation to ‘do some-
thing for its own sake’. Kant, Goethe and Beethoven challenge the theo-
retical negation of German uniqueness. Their observable distinctness
hints at that of German intellectual culture. Yet reﬂecting on the social
dimension of this observation suggests that it is merely guided by com-
modity thinking, which makes of these ﬁgures German ‘possessions’ and
‘brand[s]’. Germany’s intellectual achievements require further scrutiny,
namely in terms of their social dimension. The delay in capitalist develop-
ment rendered Germany’s cultural production somewhat resistant to
commodiﬁcation. The formula ‘for its own sake’ is appropriate, because
the nation’s intellectual life ‘understood itself’ as a ‘being in-itself’ not as
‘an object of exchange’. Notwithstanding Adorno’s initial scepticism,
here German culture does seem to stand out, albeit historically, rather
than, as it seems on the surface, naturally (CM 206–7). And even this
insight is inconclusive. TheGerman intellect was not entirely delivered up
to commodity exchange, but it was still ‘for-something-else’, the state. As
the idealist ‘pathos of the absolute’ indicates, it conspired with the political
desire to subjugate the world. From this angle, the German intellect is as
socialised as the intellect elsewhere (CM 208–9).
Yet surely the undeniable empirical fact of National Socialism alleviates
all theoretical doubts about German uniqueness. Given that Germany
was thinking in those absolutist, authoritarian terms, Adorno concedes, it
is no accident that Hitler came to power there. Yet from another angle,
Adorno also scrutinises and unsettles this fact, underlining that fascism is
a ‘socio-economi[c]’, not a national problem and therefore not uniquely
German. ‘Such complexity’, he insists, ‘discourages any unambiguous
answer to the question’, ‘What is German?’ (CM 209). This is not a
shortcoming of the analysis: social reality itself deﬁes the sociologist’s
theoretical decryption.
Seeking to avoid skating over the difﬁculty of the matter for the sake of
deﬁnite results, Adorno starts over. He resorts to his personal observa-
tions of Germanness with a ‘more modes[t]’ question: ‘Why did I return?’
The fact that the refugee returned to a country that had slaughtered
millions and would have slain him too suggests that there must be some-
thing uniquely attractive about it. Adorno immediately qualiﬁes this.
Renewed reﬂections on the social conditions inﬂuencing his decision
imply he may have just ‘identiﬁ[ed] with the familiar’. Also, his opposition
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to the dominant powers before leaving made it equally difﬁcult to inte-
grate abroad, and the catastrophe made it imperative to return and strug-
gle against its recurrence. This makes Adorno wary of subscribing to the
idea of German speciﬁcity suggested by his observations. Back on the
empirical level, however, Adorno concedes that Germany’s resistance to
the American attitude to ‘keep smiling’ distinguishes German culture.
Simultaneously, he invites readers to reﬂect critically on the social dimen-
sion of this point: the American ‘view of life’ conceals the threatening
contradictions of capitalist society – but so does the belief in a pure
intellectual culture. The distinction between a German intellectual
Kultur and an American ‘culture’ of ‘refrigerators’ may well be unfair
(CM 209–10).
Counter to this theoretical assertion, recourse to the empirical domain
of personal observations yields another suggestion of German cultural
distinction. As mentioned, Adorno considers it a signiﬁcant observation
that in the USA, in contrast to Germany, his texts were edited to the point
of being unrecognisable. Scrutinising this observation in a wider socio-
historical context does not lead Adorno to dispute it. He surmises that
Germany’s ‘economic backwardness’, compared with the Anglo-Saxon
world, left an exceptional ‘refuge’ for the intellect where it can, for now,
hide from integration and commodiﬁcation (CM 210–11).29
Theoretical sociological analysis manifests itself similarly in Adorno’s
1969 essay ‘Free Time’. Collected in Catchwords, this piece continues his
work on the culture industry. Adorno sets out from a personal observation
of a quotidian detail. He ﬁnds the question ‘What is your hobby?’ difﬁcult:
‘I have no hobby. Not that I’m a workaholic . . .’, but reading and music
are ‘integral’ to ‘my existence’ and defy the label ‘hobby’. ‘[C]onversely,
my work, philosophical and sociological production and university
teaching, . . . has been so blissful to me that I am unable to express it
within . . . opposition to free time’. Judged purely by his perception of the
question, Adorno sees no difference between work and leisure. However,
he concedes that such perceptions are untrustworthy and calls for reﬂec-
tion on the conditions shaping them. The distinction between work and
spare time collapses only for someone granted such rare relative profes-
sional autonomy. The majority who depend on taking any job regardless
of its content will have an alternative view (CM 168–9).
29 Elsewhere, Adorno (1991a: 121) undermines his point that this was speciﬁc to Germany,
arguing that Austrian and French radical art was only possible because in the early 1900s
the ‘administered world and social modernity’ had not yet seized these countries
completely.
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Adorno subsequently proceeds to the empirical differences between
work and free time. Similarly to the question ‘Have you not been on
holiday?’, posed by co-workers astonished at one’s pale skin in the sum-
mer, ‘What is your hobby?’ sounds like a directive that one must have one.
Moreover, just as it is commonly accepted that production ought not to
be distracted by play, people agree that leisure must not require any
effort reminiscent of work. Theoretical decoding of these observations
initially supports the implied distinction, albeit differently from how the
co-workers perceive it. In capitalism’s ‘functional system’, the separation
between work and leisure testiﬁes to the widespread yearning to escape
quotidian boredom and conventions (CM 168–70). Where individuals
spend their days working in conditions beyond their control, ‘free time’
intends a period free from that (CM 167).
Upon further reﬂection, the distinction between leisure and work col-
lapses again. Yet the theoretical perspective Adorno offers here retains
nothing of the blissful perception of their unity he set out from. Leisure
products are commodities, dominated by the same exchange and proﬁt
principle that dominates work (CM 169–71). Indeed, capitalism is typi-
ﬁed not only by the reiﬁcation of labour and its products as commodities
(CM 169), but also by humans treating themselves like things after work:
in sunbathing ‘merely for the sake of the tan . . . the fetish character of
commodities seizes people . . .; they become fetishes to themselves’ (CM
170). Many spare-time activities, albeit superﬂuous and uncreative, play
on the pretence of real spontaneity, mollifying people’s recognition that
their productive capacities are fettered and their ability to transform the
‘petriﬁed relations’ limited (CM 172–3). In reality, leisure as relaxation
and sports reproduces labour power through rest and through enhancing
ﬁtness and team skills: leisure is fused with the workday (CM 169–70,
173–4).30
Further empirical observation also implies the sameness of work and
free time. Some leisure activities, Adorno points out, bore their partic-
ipants as much as work does. The analysis of its social dimension suggests
that boredom after work reﬂects the ever-same world of commercially
determined leisure, while boredom at work reﬂects the standardised tasks
of a meticulously divided production process. Boredom is further fuelled
by people’s notion that they cannot transform their lives in the overpow-
ering social conditions and that they must even surrender their imagina-
tion in order to adjust to those conditions for survival (CM 171–2). The
complexities created by the changing perspectives on free time in
30 See Morgan 1988 on Adorno’s views on sports.
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exchange society are evident. A puzzled Adorno admits: ‘In the age of
truly unparalleled social integration, it is difﬁcult to make out at all, what
in humans would be other than functionally determined’ (CM 167).
Full accounts of the arguments in Adorno’s theoretical analyses would
require longer discussions of the two texts. I aimed to distil passages that
illustrate his efforts to scrutinise empirical data with a view to their social
dimension and with a view to what they express of exchange society.
Adorno persistently examines to what extent factual reconstructions are
merely the upshot of the social conditions of observation and how phe-
nomena themselves are socially characterised. This operation repeatedly
‘strikes’ the material in which these dimensions hide like lightning and
vaporises the factual material’s claim to represent reality faithfully.
Reciprocity and negativity Upon reading Adorno’s Minima
Moralia, Kracauer wrote to his friend:
Really, Teddie, . . . when I found an interpretation one-sided or it seemed dissat-
isfactory to me for some other reason, a passage followed shortly thereafter which
revised or added to your ﬁrst position . . . It was . . . as though you had been looking
over my shoulder, or even into me, smiled about my scruples, and held out to me
the next member of the thought, a thought which already anticipated, and mostly
superseded still, what I wanted to say to you. (A&K 456)
Kracauer expresses a sociologico-methodological problem which is more
serious than his formulations suggest. This problem is visible in Adorno’s
Critical Models. His reﬂections on the material’s social dimension offer
several distinct perspectives on the respective phenomena in their social
mediation and glimpses of exchange society: Adorno’s debate on
‘Germanness’ tackles intellectual socialisation, for instance; ‘Free Time’
broaches reiﬁcation and commodiﬁcation. Yet the theoretical consider-
ations offer no answers. In response to the question ‘What is German?’,
this is a political point. By arguing that even the putative ‘fact’ that there
exists a German character awaiting description is dubious, Adorno turns
his reply against precisely the classiﬁcatory identity thinking that raised the
question. Adorno’s constantly revised statements convey the dilemma
that in opaque social conditions, society, and therefore single socialised
phenomena too, resist complete decipherment and determination. His
essays, Adorno warns, are discontinuous because reality is ruptured.
Their ‘insights’ not only ‘conﬁrm’ and ‘multiply’, but also relativise and
‘qualify [einschränken: restrain, limit] themselves’ (NLI 16). Neither facts
nor theory are conclusive. The investigations must continue. This
requires renewed engagement with empirical observation, whose socially
limitedmaterial inevitably faces theoretical scrutiny in turn. The two poles
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enter into a reciprocal relationship. Whereas Adorno’s American sociol-
ogy chieﬂy intended such reciprocity, the texts here realise it.
This can be made explicit. Gillespie (1995: 56) hears in Adorno’s
writing ‘strong rhythmic elements’, ‘regular rhythmic units’, parts of
sentences with different ‘rhythmic values’. Listening closely to the
‘rhythm’ of Adorno’s Critical Models is telling in this context. Yet although
‘rhythm’ is a ﬁtting term, I mean something different by it. The rhythmic
elements decisive here are not parts of sentences, but two kinds of passages:
those representing the empirical and those representing the theoretical
dimension of Adorno’s investigations. Charting the rhythm of Adorno’s
models suggests that he constantly shifts back and forth between those two
dimensions, concluding in neither, and thus sustaining their reciprocal
relation – all the while pursuing the same issue.
‘What Is German?’, to exemplify this, begins by unsettling the empirical
suggestion that German intellectual culture is unique with reference to the
hidden social conditions suffusing the observing subject. Adorno’s return
to the empirical dimension of his compatriots’ intellectual achievements
challenges that reﬂection. His examination of these achievements in light
of their underlying social dimension is inconclusive, conﬁrming German
cultural uniqueness in one respect, denying it in two others. The inves-
tigation continues on the empirical level, where the obvious fact of
German fascism undermines the theoretical denial of German unique-
ness. Yet Adorno’s reﬂections are once more inconclusive, suggesting
German uniqueness from one angle, questioning it from another. With
a narrower question in mind, the investigation continues, and Adorno
returns to the empirical level. There he seems to observe German unique-
ness, but disclosing the observation’s social content unsettles it. Another
empirical observation challenges the theoretical denial of German
uniqueness yet again, whereas renewed reﬂection negates that observa-
tion. Perplexingly, and against the latter negation, renewed confronta-
tions with the empirical reality of German intellectual life suggest its
peculiarity, as do Adorno’s subsequent interpretations.
Notwithstanding assurances that his essays have renounced the ‘ideal’
of ‘indubitable certainty’ (NLI 13), in Adorno’s later sociological texts,
theory still regularly seems to have the last word over empiry. ‘What Is
German?’ and ‘Free Time’ constantly shift between the two rhythmic
elements, but the empirical passages are usually short and rapid, the
analytical passages long and elaborate. Signiﬁcantly, though, and in con-
trast with Adorno’s American texts, the longer reﬂections regularly come
to an abrupt halt. Adorno leaves no doubt that the phenomena in their
social mediation are not fully decoded. His theoretical perspectives on the
material’s social dimension often even conﬂict with one another, such as
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in the simultaneous conﬁrmation and denial of a socially determined
German cultural uniqueness. The theoretical statements may sound con-
clusive in isolation. It is just that this is true of several scarcely reconcilable
statements, so that the reﬂections end up highlighting each other’s
inconclusiveness. Accordingly, the investigation always continues, pursu-
ing the same question on the empirical level. For instance, where Adorno
overtly concedes the ‘ambiguity’ of his reﬂections halfway through
‘What Is German?’, he immediately returns to the empirical problem of
‘Germanness’ with his more ‘modest question’. Also, in both texts the
observations occasionally challenge theoretical statements, notwithstand-
ing that the observations are, in turn, alwaysmetwith theoretical scrutiny –
usually with the scrutiny of analyses which are unsatisfactory and forced to
re-engage with empiry. If their textual rhythm is ampliﬁed, Adorno’s
models illustrate the tendency in his sociological examinations of
exchange society to relate the empirical and theoretical levels reciprocally.
Correspondingly, these texts display the tendency towards negation.
The different theoretical perspectives challenge each other without reso-
lution, as well as relentlessly negating every empirical observation’s claim
to truth. Theoretical conclusions and trustworthy facts being unavailable,
the studies do not offer much by way of positive results. In the ﬁrst piece,
theory is as effective in negating the view that German culture is unique as
it is equally in negating the view that it is not. Through the ambiguities in
his writing, Adorno highlights social reality’s withdrawal from identiﬁca-
tion. Similarly, theory calls into doubt both the distinction between free
time and work, as well as their sameness. Adorno can only presume that if
there still is a dimension of life exempted from production, it will be as
good as indiscernible.
It would be myopic to pillory Adorno for failing to master these short-
comings without noting that they are consistent with his methodological
arguments about the socially conditioned limitations of sociological anal-
ysis.31 Adorno’s perpetual demonstration of his failure to grasp social
reality empirically and theoretically certainly raises questions about the
viability of sociology qua examination of exchange society. Yet, partly for
this reason, sociological analysis remains consequential. Not only do the
investigations offer various – however problematic – perspectives on
exchange society and its single phenomena, but negations also persistently
expose non-identity: the incongruence between the socialised subject’s
factual and theoretical conceptions of social reality on the one hand and
social reality itself on the other. In the rhythm of reﬂection of his critical
31 For Adorno, a presentation of the failed world in the failed world will ultimately fail (see
Geulen 2001: 49–50).
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models one can hear the reverberations of Adorno’s sociological non-
identity thinking. According to Adorno, the ensuing recognition of the
resistance of social reality – which mediates sociology’s empirical facts,
research phenomena and theoretical procedures – to sociological inquiry
constitutes a methodological as well as substantive sociological insight.
Dense experience Minima Moralia contains an apposite descrip-
tion of the process of thinking that operates in the analyses explored here.
Thought is not ‘a discursive progression from stage to stage’, but neither
do ‘insights fall from Heaven’. ‘Rather, one cognises in a network of
prejudices, intuitions, innervations, self-corrections, presuppositions, and
exaggerations’: they form the subject’s ‘dense . . . experience’ (MM 80).
A passage in Adorno’s Sociological Writings, referring to the reciprocity
between empiry and theory in the sociological thought process, speciﬁes:
‘Solely a combination, difﬁcult to anticipate theoretically, of fantasy and
ﬂair for the facts reaches up to the ideal of experience’ (SSI 185–6).
Though none of them are satisfactory, theoretical engagements with
empirical sociological data enhance the experience of exchange society
by offering various perspectives on it. What is intriguing, if less obvious,
is that negation generates a further dimension of the experience of
society. In the studies cited, reﬂection relentlessly unsettles empirical
material, highlighting that factual reconstructions do not trustworthily
represent the reality they claim to be representing. Reﬂection does so by
repeatedly suggesting that the material bears a social dimension which is
not immediately accessible. The theoretical considerations come to no
conclusions either. Society and the phenomena mediated by it are not
fully accessible even to theory. This shows in the text, which constantly
undergoes abrupt stops, sudden ruptures and unexpected changes in
direction, rather than settling with solutions to the puzzles at issue.
Adorno conveys the experience of a social whole which, albeit determin-
ing all thought and single phenomena, confronts people as an impene-
trable instance. Negation generates – and, in writing, expresses32 – the
experience of estrangement, of a society that is so fossilised that it befalls
individuals as intransigent essence. What Adorno once said of Benjamin
in a different context applies to his own reﬂections here: he ‘look[s] at all
objects so closely, until they bec[o]me strange and as strange ones g[i]ve
away their secret’ (VSI 169). ‘Through complete estrangement, the
social relation reveals itself to be blind second nature, which is what’ –
here Adorno in turn adopts a Benjaminian image – ‘the mythical
32 See Chapter 5.
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landscape used to be, into whose allegorical image the unattainable and
unapproachable congeals’ (NLI 179).
Positivist sociology, Adorno alleges, pins the fact down as ‘that which is
the case’, without theoretically situating it in the social dynamic which
conditioned it and within which it operates. The fact is severed from its
‘historical implications’ and ‘presented as something timeless’ and ‘unal-
terable’ (IS 148–9). Veblen provides a sociological counterpoint. He
deciphers a range of inconspicuous cultural phenomena as manifestations
of dominant social institutions, especially of the demonstration of ‘power’
through ‘conspicuous consumption’ (IS 146). Veblen allows contempo-
rary cultural phenomena to speak of their ‘prehistory’, notably of the
perpetuation of institutions that already characterised the barbarian age.
This orientation of Veblen’s work is certainly evident when The Theory of
the Leisure Class (1994b) is read alongside The Instinct of Workmanship
(1994a).33 It is also evident that in order to remain consistent with his
criticism of positivism and remark on Veblen, Adorno cannot settle with
his theoretical perspectives on capitalism’s ‘mythical landscape’. Indeed,
Adorno’s theoretical investigations never articulate surrender before their
tasks. He exhibits, but does not accept as ﬁnal, the discrepancies in his
examinations, making ever renewed efforts to grasp the matter more
adequately in social terms. Adorno’s efforts display his struggle to negate
the socially conditioned, sociologically instructive, but simultaneously
unsatisfactory, estranged perspective of an opaque society qua impene-
trable instance. Theoretical analysis echoes the double character of
Adorno’s sociology. Negation registers the petrifaction of society, but
the notion that society is inherently inscrutable, natural, essential is also
negated. Interpretation must persevere so as to unearth the congealed
oppositions emerging from theoretical analysis as well as to dissolve what
has coagulated: to decipher, in close touch with the facts, the social whole
and its single phenomena as what they are, the historically changeable
affair of human beings.
The texts examined in this section are only partly successful at fulﬁlling
this analytical aim. In ‘Free Time’ (CM 174–5, see also IS 152–3),
Adorno presents interpretations of data established by an Institute survey
of people’s reactions to media representations of an aristocratic wedding.
Against the expectation that the culture industry ‘utterly dominates’ con-
sciousness and encourages ‘personalization’, it was found that – in their
thinking – individuals had escaped control to some extent and digressed
from conventional uncritical thought patterns. This suggests the
33 In other writings, Adorno is more critical of Veblen (P 75–94, PD 108).
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possibility that humans might bring about wider social transformations.34
But otherwise, the models in focus here, not unlike the texts cited in
Chapter 1, tend to portray the individuals who maintain society as though
they were compelled to do so by objective forces. Recall Adorno’s dis-
cussion of sport, which trains its unsuspecting participants for the pro-
duction process. In ‘What Is German?’, Adorno makes references to the
historical genesis of the social conditions against which the question is
read. Overall, however, society’s historical transformability is indicated
allusively, abstractly or through negating society’s appearance as an invar-
iant object. Society, Adorno reiterates in Negative Dialectics, has devel-
oped ‘the semblance that what is is inescapable and thereby legitimated’.
He insists that it is possible to ‘see through’ this ‘total society’ and show
how ‘threadbare’ its ‘apologia’ actually is. But his advice on how theory
might tackle this task is characteristically brief: it would require ‘the
physiognomics of the total condition and of the extended individual
data’ and ‘the analysis of economic structural transformations’ (ND
265). The difﬁculties with fulﬁlling one of their own objectives – with
deciphering social reality more explicitly and concretely as a historical,
alterable context generated and maintained by humans – are beginning to
take shape as a persistent problem of Adorno’s sociological analyses of
exchange society.
Recalcitrant relevance
Outhwaite questions the dismissal of the concept of society as obsolete
proposed by postmodern and globalisation theories. He defends a ‘mod-
est conception of society’ (2006: 108). ‘Society is the product of sociation,
the actions of individuals in structured contexts’ (2006: 95); it is ‘a
condition and a continuously reproduced outcome of action’ involving
material as well as cognitive practices. This constitutes ‘a real deﬁnition of
society’ (2006: 91). It allows for conceptions of ‘social structures and
mechanisms’ if ‘they explain satisfactorily . . . the observable phenomena
of social life’ (2006: 87). One of Outhwaite’s (2006: 86) sources is
Adorno’s concept of society. According to Outhwaite (2006: 82–3),
Adorno evokes an ‘imperceptible yet . . . real structure determining . . .
concrete human actions’ without ‘depreciat[ing] . . . the individual’ and
emphasises ‘the interpenetration of thought and reality’. By relating
Adorno’s concept of society to idealist and realist models, Outhwaite
34 Cook (1996: 65–73) cites this and other passages to underline Adorno’s awareness of
ruptures in the culture industry’s control of consciousness.
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offers an original angle on Adorno’s concept and its potential signiﬁcance
for contemporary sociology.
It might be interjected that arguments for the continuing relevance of
Adorno’s sociology which involve no criticisms of its most problematic
components end up suggesting that his sociological work – tied, of course,
to the project of investigating capitalist exchange society – would prove
irrelevant if it were exposed in detail. Adorno’s conception of capitalist
society as a petriﬁed structure which constrains individuals while being
reproduced by them alone is scarcely modest, but mediates two extremes.
Outhwaite (2006: 85) rightly states that Adorno’s ‘dialectical theory of
society’ seeks to do ‘justice to . . . contradictory moments’. A conception
which involves contradictions, in turn, constitutes a troublesome resource
for attempts to deﬁne social reality. As I highlighted above and in
Chapter 1, while Adorno theoretically investigates the social structures
and mechanisms underpinning empirical phenomena, the concurrent
endeavour to explain phenomena exhaustively or conclusively encounters
tremendous obstacles. One of the key contributions – or challenges – of
Adorno’s sociology of an omnipresent yet persistently elusive capitalist
whole seems to be his demonstration of the difﬁculties sociologists face in
their struggles to deﬁne contemporary society and explain particular
phenomena.
Scholars aware of the dilemmas Adorno’s sociology encounters may
see them as occasions for denying its contemporary signiﬁcance.
Critical theory, Honneth (1991: 61–2) emphasises, cannot be ‘empirically
controlled’. Empirical social science is treated as an ‘auxiliary
discipline’. Simultaneously, though, theory takes a ‘negativistic turn’: it
is ‘den[ied] . . . any claim to positive knowledge’ and receives the ‘function
of a self-criticism of conceptual thought’. Honneth alleges that Adorno
adheres to historico-philosophical theses developed in Dialectic of
Enlightenment. These theses lead him to associate all empirical and theo-
retical sciences with civilisation’s instrumental-rational control and vio-
lent domination of inner and outer nature, and hence to oppose empirical
as well as positive theoretical knowledge. One might proceed to conclude
that the methodological impasses of Adorno’s sociology, conditioned
purely by a dogmatic insistence on disputable theorems written in the
ﬁrst half of the last century, prove the inability of his sociological work to
speak to present debates in the discipline.
Before responding to Honneth’s argument, it is worth underlining that
for Adorno sociological ‘theorizing’ is indeed ‘relatively autonomous’
(Outhwaite 2006: 85) from empirical research, at least during certain
analytical steps. This is doubtless part of his work’s attraction for present-
day opponents of empirical realism like Outhwaite (2006: 87). It is also a
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potential point of disagreement between Adorno and contemporary soci-
ologists who demand that sociologico-theoretical frameworks be empiri-
cally plausible. Urry (2000b: 21–2, 27) is careful in raising this demand for
his inﬂuential ‘metaphorical’ framework of mobilities, networks, scapes,
nodes and ﬂows, which he proposes for a twenty-ﬁrst-century ‘sociology
beyond societies’. Adorno assigns to theory the task of analysing socio-
logically decisive aspects of social reality which elude empirical observa-
tion. The criterion that sociology’s theoretical frameworks be empirically
plausible throughout would constrain them in tackling this task. For the
more a framework claims to represent of the unobservable, the more
prone it is to the charge of being empirically uncorroborated. Vis-à-vis
the standard of complete empirical plausibility, theoretical analyses
recede from capturing the unobservable. Accordingly Adorno’s theory
of exchange society, employed to interpret empirical facts with regards to
what they do not represent, need not answer to facts in all its facets. ‘There
are sociological theorems’, he replies to Popper, ‘which, as insights into
the mechanisms of society which operate behind the façade . . . contradict
appearances to such an extent that they cannot be adequately criticized
through the latter’. The theory of social integration, an analytical frame-
work for a social tendency beyond immediate empirical grasp, ‘recoil[s]
from tests’. ‘Nevertheless, the dependence of that which can be socially
observed upon the total structure is, in reality, more valid than any ﬁnd-
ings which can be irrefutably veriﬁed in the particular and this dependence
is anything but a mere ﬁgment of the imagination’ (PD 112–13). In fact,
the more a theoretical conﬁguration deciphers of the material’s hidden
content, the more it unsettles the material’s claim to represent reality.
From this perspective, the demand to ‘stick to the facts’ would unjustiﬁ-
ably bind a theoretical conception to observations which are untrustwor-
thy precisely because they cannot reveal the social context beyond
observation. The more theoretical statements ‘transcend the limited and
immediate situation and . . . relate it to basic social conditions’, to repeat
Adorno’s formulation, ‘themore valuable they are’ (CoM 103). Sociology
requires empirical material as substance for reﬂection, but the frameworks
employed to decipher it are enabled to go ‘beyond the factual’ (SSI 543),
to penetrate thematerial’s hidden dimensions, and to acquire perspectives
on capitalist society which are unavailable to observation. Of course,
nothing shields the resulting statements from further theoretical scrutiny
and hence from renewed confrontations with empirical data.
Honneth’s portrayal of the methodological impasses in Adorno’s soci-
ology, notably the notion that they are conditioned by Adorno’s adher-
ence to theses about science’s instrumental rationality, is unduly narrow.
To restate these impasses in terms of this chapter: from Adorno’s
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sociological viewpoint, observations and data are untrustworthy and
prone to theoretical decipherment, while theoretical analysis remains
incomplete, inconclusive, often even contradictory, and is thus subject
to further scrutiny. As I have sought to argue, Adorno refers facts to
theoretical scrutiny and theoretical assertions to further examination
primarily on the basis of inquiries into obstacles which the current social
conditions create for empirical and theoretical sociological research. This
has implications for judging the ongoing relevance of Adorno’s sociology.
If one follows Honneth, contradicting Adorno’s supposedly stubborn
subsumption of all scientiﬁc thinking under the concept of a violent
instrumental reason sufﬁces to unsettle Adorno’s critique of empirical
and theoretical research and exempts contemporary social science from
any further concern with it. If one follows the reading I propose, defusing
Adorno’s warnings issued to sociologists conducting empirical and theo-
retical research today would require sociologists to show that the socially
generated socio-scientiﬁc problems he highlights do not exist – or to solve
them.
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